Editorial overview: Relational values: what are they, and what's the fuss about? by Chan, K.M et al.
Editorial overview: Relational values: what are they, and
what’s the fuss about?
Kai MA Chan, Rachelle K Gould and Unai Pascual
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability
2018, 35:A1–A7
For a complete overview see the Issue
1877-3435/ã 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2018.11.003
1877-3435/ã 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Abstract
Relational values—as preferences, principles and virtues about human-nature
relationships—have attracted a great deal of attention in recent years. The term has
been used to include concepts and knowledge from a wide range of social sciences
and humanities, e.g., importantly making space for qualitative approaches often
neglected within environmental management and science. Meanwhile, crucial
questions have emerged. What counts as a relational value, and what does not?
How do relational values (RVs) compare with other value categories and terms,
including held, assigned, instrumental, moral, shared, social, and non-material
values (e.g., associated with cultural ecosystem services)? In this article, we address
these issues, partly by providing context about how the RV term originated and how
it has evolved to date. Most importantly, because of their somewhat unique
combination of groundedness and moral relevance, positive relational values may
offer important opportunities for the evolution of values that may be necessary for
transformative change towards sustainability. The special issue includes
contributions that contemplate particular concepts (e.g., care, stewardship,
eudaimonia—human flourishing), applications (e.g., environmental assessment,
environmental policy design), and the history of relevant scholarship in various
intellectual traditions (e.g., ecological economics, human ecology, environmental
education). Together with this suite of thought-provoking papers, we hope that the
clarification we provide here facilitates a broad and productive interdisciplinary
exchange to create and refine a reflective but powerful tool for sustainability and
justice.
Introduction
As we collectively grapple with environmental change and the challenge of
sustainability, there is increasing attention to the role that values play and
might play in enabling stewardship and transformation [1,2]. We and others
have proposed a widening view of values to extend beyond the worth of
nature itself (intrinsic values) and what nature does for us (instrumental
values), to include preferences, principles and virtues about human-nature
relationships (relational values) [3]. By giving a common framework for ideas
long studied in a range of disciplines and fields, we hope that the concept of
relational values (RV) will serve as a tool for interdisciplinary integration and
the meaningful inclusion of the social sciences and diverse approaches on
values with conservation, environmental management, and sustainability
science [3,4].
These two motivations—interdisciplinary inclusion and real-world applica-
tion—have guided development of the concept of relational values. The first
aim is to foster deeper understanding of human-nature relationships by
bridging concepts across divergent intellectual traditions. The second is to
assist real-world decision-making and to enable change. Some who have
been working on related topics for years have wondered, why do we need a
new term? And—given all the different uses of the word—why use ‘values’?
(e.g. some scholars from psychological backgrounds wonder why not use the
term ‘attitude’, as relational values are not the held values they generally call
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A2 Editorial overview‘values’, and RVs do overlap with attitudes). A partial
history of the RV concept may help to explain the choice
of the term. We present this history from our positions as
three actors in the collaborative development of the
concept. This brief history thus also serves to convey
part of our positionality (i.e. the contexts, identities, and
background that affect a scholar’s work—acknowledg-
ment of this is common and important in many social
science approaches).
The window of opportunity for the relational
values concept
For us, ‘relational values’ evolved from (slightly different)
first uses by Brown [5] and—from a philosophical per-
spective—Muraca [6]. One of us (KC) was a co-author on
an attempt to use this idea to broaden perspectives on the
intersection of ecosystem services and ethics [7], and
relational ideas resonated after a many-year collaboration
with Terre Satterfield on these themes. With these ideas
in mind, KC and UP found themselves immersed in
debates about values at the final IPBES Conceptual
Framework workshop in Cape Town (2013), the story
of which reveals much about the vagaries of science-
policy processes.
Thanks to crucial groundwork by many previous scholars
[e.g. 8,9], and a series of previous workshops organized by
IPBES, the Cape Town workshop provided a key window
of opportunity to shape the scholarship at the heart of
IPBES, with reverberations well beyond [10]. Respond-
ing to discussions which featured intrinsic and instrumen-
tal values as the only value conceptions, KC and UP
argued that intrinsic and instrumental values were too
narrow conceptually to include ideas crucial to human-
ecosystem relationships. These omitted ideas included
those from more qualitative social sciences and the
humanities, many of which were embodied in recent
conceptual and empirical work on cultural ecosystem
services by ourselves and colleagues [11–14]. Following
Muraca and Jax et al., KC proposed the addition of
‘relational values’, and thanks to UP and others, other
workshop participants agreed to bring this term into the
IPBES Conceptual Framework [1] and eventually—
given UP’s role on the multidisciplinary expert panel
of IPBES—into IPBES’ pluralistic vision on values [4].
After Cape Town, Chan et al. (now including RG) realized
that it would be helpful to more fully explain the term and
expand its focus to include those values pertaining to
human-human relationships that involve the environ-
ment (resulting in Ref. [3]). Inspired by this collaboration,
UP and KC convened a UNESCO-sponsored workshop
in San Sebastian (Basque Country) in 2016, on
‘Rethinking relational values and the environment:
Implications for Science and Policy’. At this interdisci-
plinary workshop, the idea emerged to organize a special
issue on relational values in COSUST.Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2018, 35:A1–A7 This brief history reveals that the early use of the term
was both strategic and tactical. It was strategic because
from the beginning we aspired for the long-run bridging
of diverse concepts across disparate fields and disciplines,
to affect discourses on values that permeate IPBES and
related science-policy organizations and networks. It was
tactical in that there was a limited-time opportunity, and
that opportunity was fundamentally tied to the word
‘values’ (the opportunity was to add a third kind of
‘values’ to the IPBES Conceptual Framework). Rela-
tional values—as a boundary concept between diverse
fields and also policy—builds upon many decades of work
in the humanities (including religious studies, cultural
studies, ethics, and phenomenology), sociology and
anthropology, psychology, human ecology, environmen-
tal education, human-environment geography, ecological
economics, recreation studies, political ecology, common
property/the commons, and more. And we believe it
works best when it continues to reference these founda-
tions of scholarship using many different terms prevalent
in those fields.
Successes and challenges
We see progress on the first motivation (interdisciplinary
inclusion) and also some on the second (real-world appli-
cation). We are buoyed not only by the lively and inter-
disciplinary uptake of Chan et al. [3] and Pascual et al. [4],
but more pertinently by the 65 credible abstracts that we
received for this special issue (we wish we could have
invited more), and the 17 articles that resulted. As hoped,
the excellent contributions in this issue come from a wide
range of disciplinary perspectives. Working closely with
the contributing authors broadened our own minds and
views of human-environment interactions, and helped us
to refine our approach to the relational values concept.
Although it is too early to review real-world applications,
at least we have uptake in science-policy processes (e.g.
IPBES) of some new terms and concepts that transcend
economics but still offer guidance for policy and practice.
The rapid growth of the RV idea, however, also brought
challenges. The strategic and tactical use of an already
broadly used term (‘values’) yielded conceptual ambigu-
ities. Although ambiguity can be highly constructive, just
as with sustainability [15], there is a real danger that an
ambiguous term is popular because everyone sees what
they want in it, but there is no common ground for
collective action or insight. As editors we were often
put in the uncomfortable position of trying not to police
the interpretation of our own work on RV while main-
taining some degree of consistency in the special issue. A
diversity of views is rich and instructive, but not if those
views are incommensurable or the differences incom-
pletely discussed [16]. After deep and constructive dis-
cussions among editors and thoughtful authors, we think
we have collectively succeeded at achieving both consis-
tency and diversity. But you be the judge.www.sciencedirect.com
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The budding literature using the term ‘relational values’ and
the experience of editing this special issue made it obvious
that several concepts had become—or had always been—
muddled, and that there was a need to clarify. And yet we do
so with considerable hesitation. Our purpose has never been
to wade into and deepen esoteric nuances of semantics, and
we hesitated to lose the accessibility of some of our other
work [3]. For some or many readers, in some or many
contexts, there is likelynoneedtodistinguishthesedifferent
conceptions of values—what matters is that there is a space
to express what matters to people on their own terms.
And yet, for others, understanding relational values in
relation to other terms and concepts is an essential pre-
requisite—required before they can engage with the term
at all. They have a point: without clearly delineating
concepts, we run the risk of sowing not insight but
confusion. Furthermore, by describing how these terms
and concepts relate to each other, we hope to provide a
birds-eye view of this landscape of literatures and thus
enable readers to situate their work more richly and read









































































































Relationships between several prominent value concepts. Spatial overlap in
be both assigned and relational (see text). Sideways text indicates a defined
subset of assigned values). As a single illustrative example, a farmer may h
also apply this notion of fairness to the context of pesticides in a relational
because they undermine the utility of the chemical for other farmers (by fos
also care deeply for the land in a way that is crucial to her identity and well
fostering pollinators primarily for yield gains (following instrumental/econom
(an intrinsic value). These values are deeply intertwined (e.g. caring for the
or otherwise).
www.sciencedirect.com These clarifications emerged from stimulating conversa-
tions among authors of Chan et al. [3], participants at the
2016 workshop in San Sebastian, and between the three
of us also with others, sometimes poring over key refer-
ences. Because the term is still evolving, positions cannot
be proven, and the answers below should be understood
as proposals, not fact.
Did relational values begin with Brown [5]?
Yes and no. Brown laid groundwork, claiming that all values
are relational in origin; we are focused on those that are
relational in content. It has become popular to cite Brown
[5] for the origin of relational values, but he never actually
used that term (he wrote about ‘values in the relational
realm’ (p.233)), and it seems he meant something slightly
different. In one very brief section, between descriptions
of held and assigned values, Brown wrote, ‘Value in the
relational realm is not observable; it is only at the feeling
level. However, value in the relational realm often gives
rise to an expression of value, which brings us to the
object realm.’ (p.233) At that point he moves on to
assigned values. As such, it seems that Brown wrote only
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dicates conceptual overlap, where, for example eudaimonic values can
 subset within a category (e.g. instrumental/economic values are a
ave a strong held value regarding fairness (which is also moral), and
 (and moral) principle that careless pesticide applications are wrong
tering the evolution of resistance among pests). The same farmer may
-being (a relational and eudaimonic value), while simultaneously
ic values), and believing in the inherent rights of all species to exist
 land may be stronger when reinforced by the benefits yielded, tangible
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2018, 35:A1–A7
A4 Editorial overviewstem from relational processes. In this special issue, as
clarified elegantly by Himes & Muraca (this issue), we
are talking about values that are relational in content, that is
values where the relationship itself matters, as more than a
means to an end (a preference for seeing birds is relational
in origin; a sense of kinship with birds is relational in
content) (for more about relationality in content, see ‘Why
are eudaimonic values relational . . . ?’).
Are held values relational values?
No. Held values are wholly abstract; relational values have an
object. Several authors in the special issue initially lumped
held and relational values together, or included as rela-
tional values particular held values such as justice, equity,
and solidarity. For the sake of conceptual simplicity, we
would propose that relational and held values are related
but distinct. Held values are ‘the modes of conduct, end-
states, or qualities which could possibly be desirable’ for
instance including ‘frugality, generosity, courage, obedi-
ence, responsibility, and fairness’ but also ‘wisdom, hap-
piness, freedom, equality, beauty, pleasure, and
friendship’ [5]. RVs can take the form of a held value
as applied to a thing or things (e.g. equality with other
species; solidarity towards a particular fox; responsibility
toward living nature).
Are relational values the values ‘about nature’ or ‘of
nature’?
Both. In Chan et al. [3], we were careful to write about
relationalvaluesabout—notof—nature.Wesoughtprimarily
to make space for the notion that values matter, and not only
as the measure of instrumental worth, but as representations
of what many people find meaningful about nature (e.g.
attachments, commitments, and responsibilities). Yet RVs
can also be values of nature. The concept of eudaimonia is
important to understanding why. Eudaimonic values con-
cern contributions to a good life, where that good life implies
not pure hedonism but rather living in accordance with
moral principles and virtues. As such, eudaimonic values
regarding nature are a key subset of relational values (the
value of nature—or relationships with parts of nature—
towards a good life). Whereas a relational value about nature
might be responsibility toward a wild mushroom patch, a
linked relational value of nature would be the multi-faceted
contributionthatharvesting mushroomsmakes to a good life
(e.g. by connecting one to the land, maintaining traditions,
motivating a relaxing and contemplative activity).
Are relational values assigned values?
They can be: eudaimonic values (a subset of relational values)
can be assigned values. Assigned values, following Brown
[5], are values of things. Thus, just as eudaimonic values
can be values ‘of’ nature, they can also be described as
assigned values. When economists and conservation biol-
ogists speak of valuation, they generally speak of assigned
values (e.g. the worth of pollination in boosting crop
production); some relational values are subject to thisCurrent Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2018, 35:A1–A7 type of valuation (e.g. we could use constructed scales to
express the worth of a river to a community [11]).
Why are eudaimonic values relational, not instrumental?
Eudaimonic values of a thing are relational insofar as the
relationship with the thing matters (not just as a means to an
end). Because valuation (of assigned values) so often co-
occurs with economic approaches, it may be confusing to
think that (eudaimonic) relational values are also subject to
valuation. Why don’t we just consider eudaimonic values
instrumental (not relational), then? The key point here is
theoretical substitutability: if the value of a thing is in
principle substitutable, and the relationship is merely a
means to an end, the thing is valuable instrumentally [7]
(Himes & Muraca, this issue). Insofar as the relationship
takes on its own meaning as more than a means to an end,
the thing is not wholly substitutable and the value is also
relational (see de Groot et al., this issue, on eudaimonia). We
imagine that a good life would generally include some
purely instrumental relationships (e.g. with any disposable
item, fossil fuels for transportation, most raw metals and
component materials). Yet in keeping with the above
sources, we propose maintaining ‘eudaimonic values’ as
a concept distinct from instrumental values, reserved for
relationships wherein the thing is not entirely substitutable
(e.g. a tree planted to commemorate a birth or death, which
may also provide needed shade). Accordingly, although a
good life might benefit from instrumental values, eudai-
monic values are the contributions that are relational.
Are relational values moral values?
Some are—those values that are intended to apply universally
are moral. Some authors have suggested an equivalence
between intrinsic and moral values, but we argue that
relational values also can be moral. However, some rela-
tional values are only intended for private application, and
these are not moral. Moral values are ones that are
intended to apply universally (e.g. equal consideration
of interests; human rights to clean water) [17,18]. As such,
any preference, principle or virtue that is only for oneself
would not be moral. For example, we may see regular
outdoor recreation as a private virtue—a commitment to
ourselves—and we believe that people generally have
responsibilities to mitigate our impacts on nature. The
former is private, whereas the latter is moral.
Are shared, social, cultural, and plural values relational?
Perhaps—many shared, social, and cultural values are rela-
tional; value pluralism is different entirely. We applaud the
recent attention to shared, social, cultural, and plural values
[19] (see also the 2019 Special Feature in Sustainability
Science). The terms shared, social, and cultural values are
defined variously, and definitions (and distinctions among
the concepts) are evolving. Common elements of defini-
tions include that these types of values address social good;
are other-regarding; and/or are shared or beyond individual
valuers. In general, these values are not entirelywww.sciencedirect.com
Editorial overview Chan, Gould and Pascual A5instrumental (i.e., not substitutable), so most are likely
relational. Unlike many conceptions of shared, social,
and cultural values, relational values can also pertain to
values held by individuals, not shared collectively.
Value pluralism, meanwhile, is often defined as theposition
that apparently different values are not ‘all reducible to one
supervalue . . . that there really are several distinctvalues’
[20] (e.g. multiple orthogonal constituents of well-being,
e.g. happiness and success) [21]. Given this, relational-
values approaches could be monistic or pluralistic. A strict
eudaimonic approach,as oneprominent example, could say
that all different values are reducible to how they contrib-
ute to a good life, which would be monistic. Most consid-
erations of relational values are likely to be pluralistic,
however, such as a characterization of the many ways that
a national park matters to people [4].
Are relational values just another way to talk about non-
material values or cultural ecosystem services?
No. Non-material values—as from cultural services or non-
material contributions to people—can be relational and/or
instrumental, and material benefits can have relational values.
Some existing papers [e.g. 22] and initial submissions to
this issue blurred this boundary between relational and
non-material or intangible values. There would be no
purpose to the term ‘relational value’ if it were synony-
mous with these existing terms. Cultural ecosystem ser-
vices were initially envisioned as instrumental, being a
component of the ecosystem services framework. Subse-
quent work argued that cultural services were often not
substitutable [23], but of course some benefits are substi-
tutable to some people, particularly monetary ones as via
ecotourism. The relational values concept provides a
language for elements of human-nature relationships that
do not fit into the provider-receiver or stock-flow meta-
phor of ecosystem services [3,13,24]. In addition, many
material/provisioning services (e.g. related to fishing,
hunting) can be deeply intertwined with instrumental
values (both material and non-material) and also deep
attachments to nature (which encompass several rela-
tional values) [12,23,25]. These points were fundamental
to and are reflected in the conception of nature’s contri-
butions to people (NCP), e.g. recognizing RVs as key
connections between NCP and good quality of life [4,26].
Thus, ecosystem services and NCP can both be valued
instrumentally and relationally; relational values are also
key components of the cultural context that gives mean-
ing to ecosystem services and NCP.
Mapping relational values in the special issue
The papers in this issue represent a wide range of
contributions (Figure 2). First, due to the relative infancy
of relational values scholarship, some contributions help
lay the conceptual and methodological foundations for
interdisciplinary study of relational values. Himes &
Muraca (this issue) distinguish between the relationalwww.sciencedirect.com (process) basis of all values and the relational content of
a subset of values (those we call RVs), thus elucidating
differences between relational, instrumental, and intrin-
sic (inherent moral) values. Muradian & Pascual (this
issue) propose a typology of human-nature relation-
ships—‘relational models’—which underpin instrumen-
tal and relational values. Schultz & Martin-Ortega (this
issue) discuss the important ways that quantitative meth-
ods can effectively contribute to RV scholarship.
Second, because relational values encompass a diversity of
separable concepts (e.g. kinship, stewardship, responsibil-
ity for nature, responsibility for people affected by envi-
ronmental change), several papers address particular rela-
tional concepts of value. Jax et al. (this issue) and West et al.
(this issue) consider the notion of care as a relational value,
and its implications for stewardship and a richer under-
standing of human well-being and behavior. And de Groot
et al. (this issue) explore the interrelated notions of part-
nership and eudaimonia, arguing that these ideas and other
relational values are central to much religious thought and
also accurate understandings of human well-being.
Third, to provide added foundations for interdisciplinary
exchange, several papers review the history or recent
scholarship in a field relevant to relational values. Ross
et al. (this issue) explore how the work of the late Stephen
Kellert, an influential scholar of environmental values,
informs the concept of relational values. Qualitative social
science researchon human ecology is reviewedbyKeleman
et al. (this issue), who conclude that both well-established
ideas as well as emerging theoretical developments have
much in common with and much to bear on relational
values research. Ishihara (this issue) applies fundamental
sociological concepts (e.g. habitus) to explore how RVs are
shared culturally and negotiated in particular contexts (e.g.
payments for ecosystem services programs). Meanwhile,
Jones and Tobin (this issue) apply a ‘substantive econom-
ics’ lens to review how people-people relational values and
instrumental values coexist in sustainable agriculture. How
relational values matter for Inuit indigenous people is
addressed by Sheremata (this issue), including how such
values are implicit in Inuit worldviews and traditional
knowledge. Stenseke (this issue) connects relational values
with landscape research in the social sciences and humani-
ties to better understand place-based human-environment
interactions.
Finally, given the aspiration that relational values may
offer new opportunities for application, several contribu-
tions examine relational values in particular contexts or
applications. De Vos et al. (this issue) review relational
values research about protected areas, highlighting the
abundance of place-focused and psychological research at
this intersection. Grubert (this issue) reviews the place
of relational values in environmental assessment pro-
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One organization of the special-issue articles (including this introductory one). Multiple categorizations are possible, and several articles could fit in
more than one category.processes lacking in their attention to crucial relational-
value considerations. In agricultural systems, Allen et al.
(this issue) examine the relevance of relational values for
farmer values and agricultural biodiversity conservation.
Bremer et al. (this issue) review the effects of payments
for watershed service programmes on relational values of
upstream water providers. And finally, Britto dos Santos &
Gould (this issue) find evidence that relational values can
change in response to environmental education
interventions.
Collectively, the suite of papers develops several
insights. First, although relational values are in their
infancy as a bridging concept, they rest upon strong
intellectual foundations in a wide range of fields and
disciplines. Second, as a deeply interdisciplinary and
collectively developed concept, RV can illuminate emer-
gent insights at the intersection of fields and disciplines.
Third, many promising opportunities for application
exist. Such applications, in diverse contexts, wouldCurrent Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2018, 35:A1–A7 foreground crucial social and social-ecological consider-
ations that have often been overlooked despite being at
the heart of conservation, sustainability, and environ-
mental management.
Conclusion
The relational values concept offers one potential avenue
for meaningful inclusion of diverse social science per-
spectives into sustainability science and environmental
decision-making. In this paper, we offered clarifications
about what relational values are (and are not). For exam-
ple, relational values are more grounded in particular
contexts than held values (e.g. equity is a held value; a
commitment to intergenerational equity for resource use
is a relational value). RVs are not equivalent to non-
material values (RVs can pertain to material or non-
material benefits). They are never purely instrumental
(for RVs, the relationship between the subject and object
matters, whereas for instrumental values the relationship
is only a means to an end). RVs are generally not values ofwww.sciencedirect.com
Editorial overview Chan, Gould and Pascual A7a thing/component of nature but instead are values about
relationships). Furthermore, RVs are often moral (as
prescriptions applicable to all), and they are measurable,
in the sense of the strength of commitment to an ideal or
aspired relationship with nature. We followed by describ-
ing how the papers in this special issue further develop
and inform the—if we dare call it this?—emerging field of
relational values scholarship.
As we reflect upon the rich groundwork laid by the papers in
this special issue, we consider whether a revolution may be
afoot—a revolution that could supplant the privileged
position that economics has played as the central discipline
for guiding policymaking and practice. Relational values
may offer one step toward a more even playing field within
which economics, other social sciences, and humanities
contribute complementary insights toward a just and sus-
tainable world. We hope that the collective effort reflected
in this issue helps scholars and decision makers incorporate
relational values in their work and better understand how
we can collectively and individually move towards more
just and sustainable relationships involving nature.
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